One would expect the common agenda of improving the quality of care in hospital sectors across nations to bring about a convergence of their quality assurance systems. However, one finds great variations in the ways in which such schemes are constructed and communicated to the general public in different countries. This paper examines three universal health care systems (England, Sweden and Japan) and explores the degree to which political institutions and public opinions affect the processes of quality assurance system building within them. It argues that the inputs from governments in response to public concerns are the key to understanding the changes in this seemingly profession-dominated policy domain; therefore policy changes are significantly affected by dynamic interactions between events, public discourses and governance structures within these countries. The findings also demonstrate that public access to information have begun to have a large impact on policy debates in all three countries.
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7 'health care'. Then unconnected or irrelevant mentions of 'quality', 'hospital' and 'health care' were excluded. The main aims of this analysis were to trace the patterns of issue saliency and to identify opinions expressed in the press. Therefore, the emphasis of the analysis was placed upon articles mentioning government (or its agency), the medical professions and opinions expressed concerning quality assurance movements in health care.
For the second variable, i.e. occurrence of prominent events such as scandals, any relevant events that were linked to government responses in quality assurance were searched and highlighted. In some cases, a search of the print media was not sufficient for linking the occurrence of such events to government decisions. In order to complement this information, semi-structured interviews with senior civil servants, doctors and academics were also conducted to confirm the findings. In particular, a very limited number of samples were located in Sweden, partly due to its localised health care system. Therefore, the search in this case was extended to include other national and some local newspapers as well as TV reports.
For the third variable, i.e. public criticisms, whether the articles treat government and/or the medical professions in a positive or negative manner was counted, and the percentage of negative reports in total was calculated. In addition, there is one further category, i.e. neutral reports, with the mere function of informing the public of news and events. This three-way separation would be useful to identify who was deemed to be responsible for health care quality issues in public discourse. Although the proportion of negative results may be affected by different reporting styles in the press in the three countries, the comparative value of negative reports for each government and the medical professions enables us to Published in Journal of Public Policy, 30, 3, 263-289 Kodate (2010) 8 measure the general trend of public opinion (as expressed in the print media). For this reason, the figures in the case study section only shows the ratio of reports critical of the government and the medical professions together with the total number of articles. Unless otherwise stated, translations of the Japanese and Swedish are by the author. In order to ensure the reliability of the data, the three-way classification was re-examined by independent native speakers.
The following section will set out the basic health governance structures of the three countries prior to empirical analysis. As previously noted, this paper seeks to explore interactions between macro political environments and nationally-advocated quality assurance systems. The methods are therefore concentrated on capturing different degrees of political interference in the system by the three national governments, not encompassing different types of quality assurance schemes at local and hospital levels.
It is also worth mentioning that this study does not aim to evaluate the success or failure of each scheme.
Basic health care governance structures in the three countries
The English National Health Service (NHS) is publicly run and centrally controlled, and hence the most institutionalised of the three systems considered here (Hollingsworth and Hanneman 1984; Klein 1996; Moran 1999; Freeman 2000) . Due to a strong tradition of parliamentary accountability, the English government and parliament should be sensitive to popular demands and the perceived performance of local hospitals even after the quasi-market reforms, given the impact of such factors on elections, policy pledges and ministerial responsibility (Klein 2001; Ham 2004) . Correspondingly, with its emphasis on democratic accountability at the local level (having county councils with tax-varying powers for hospitals), Published in Journal of Public Policy, 30, 3, 263-289 Kodate (2010) 9 the Swedish system takes a decentralised approach, with the central government and parliament (the Swedish Riksdag) playing only a guarantor's role to ensure that the whole population has equal access to good-quality health care (Saltman and Bergman 2005; Garpenby 1989; Fredriksson and Winblad 2008) .
The locus for policy-making is thus diffused across various levels of government and geared towards consensus-building among medical professionals, local politicians and central government agencies. On the other hand, health care in Japan, provided predominantly by private actors and based on social insurance schemes, is the most diffuse and least structured. The system does not hold politicians in parliament (the Japanese Kokkai) to account for delivery issues; instead semi-autonomous providers simultaneously have the discretion and carry the liability in this respect. However, with the bargaining for remuneration remaining at the national level, the government does ultimately retain leverage against private providers, who in turn have thus cultivated a special relationship with the (until recently) de facto single ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as the protector of their privileges (Campbell and Ikegami 1998; Steslicke 1973) .
As for the autonomy of medical professionals, the creation of the NHS Management Executive in England in 1988 saw the introduction of managers with a business ethos into the health services (e.g. chief executives of the NHS trusts). In this role, they became the representatives of the government as well as the patients. In Sweden, the decentralised model signifies that democratically elected members of county councils have considerable discretion in deciding what measures are necessary for providing good quality health care for their local populations, although the central government and its agency, the National Board Published in Journal of Public Policy, 30, 3, 263-289 Kodate (2010) 10 of Health and Welfare (NBHW) are responsible for overseeing and inspecting the quality and safety issues (Garpenby 1997) .
In sharp contrast to these two systems, and in the absence of a unified approach by the central government to service provision, doctors in Japan were accorded great autonomy out of respect for their noble vocation and expertise. The unique Japanese personnel management system, 3 organised in clinical departments in teaching hospitals, has not only contributed to the consolidation of collegial medical institutions but has also insulated itself from both government policy and general public scrutiny. In addition, the freedom of choice that patients enjoy has intensified the competition among providers. As a result, in exchange for the Japan Medical Association's electoral support for the LDP, 4 a beneficial package was agreed upon by both camps at the fee-schedule negotiations, and non-interference from the central government was also arranged (Campbell and Ikegami 1998; Kondo 2005 ).
In summary, at the national level, the prominence of managers in England as agents of the central government contrasts with the important arena of intermediate organisations at the county council level in Sweden. In Japan, the powerful interest group for private, office-based practitioners, the JMA, is the key negotiating partner for the government (the Ministry of Health and Welfare or MHW) if any policy is to be successfully implemented. Although the representation of the medical professionals in each political system displays great variety, the importance of expert knowledge and self-regulation within the medical professions can be emphasised in any national context. Therefore, in (decentralised) Sweden and (privatised) Japan, a nationwide quality assurance scheme appears to require an approach based on greater Published in Journal of Public Policy, 30, 3, 263-289 Kodate (2010) 11 consensus with the medical professionals. The next three sections demonstrate policy developments related to quality assurance in the three countries over the ten-year period in question, and how they are interrelated with public discourses and political structures.
England: quality assurance as a policy instrument and easy-to-access performance ratings In England, the development of a nationally established quality assurance system was rather slow until the mid-1990s, with professional self-regulation and government-driven efficiency checks existing side by side. . Following this, the quality issue became salient in the media. In July 1998, the government published the consultation document A First
Class Service: Quality in the New NHS (Department of Health 1998a), which promised to establish new national standards, and better monitoring and assessment.
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the year of 1998 saw the increase of public attention on quality assurance as well as the start of reports criticising the medical professions. After 1998, the number of articles featuring quality issues never fell below 20. This escalation of their salience had an impact on further policy development. In June, Dobson announced the inclusion of mortality rates in the performance measurements, not waiting for the publication of a new set of indicators to which the NHS Executive had been committed since 1997. He also made it public that all hospital doctors would be required to participate in a national audit program endorsed by the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI). The
Published in Journal of Public Policy, 30, 3, 263-289 Kodate (2010) 13 supporting argument was simple and straightforward: the public had the right to know about the quality of their hospital care. In his introduction to the 1999 performance tables, Dobson claimed that he hoped that the indicators would be "helpful to people working in the NHS, such as GPs, to identify places doing really well and to help identify places which should be improving their performance", but insisted that were not to be used by patients to "shop around and travel for better treatment" (Anderson 1999) . It was also emphasised that the tables were not meant to be applied as league tables of hospitals (TG, June 17, 1999) . While maintaining the preceding reforms, the Labour government softened its tone, rejecting any talk of market-led reforms in the NHS in favour of talk about patients' rights. Interestingly, public criticism of the medical professionals' self-regulation intensified as more articles began to deal with the issue.
With regard to performance ratings, strong intervention by the central government can also be observed.
The 1999 As this star-rating exercise began to gain publicity, further criticism was simultaneously targeted at the government once the effects of the 'targets-and-terror' star rating system 8 became apparent (Bevan and Hood 2006) . There was also a further link to the old primary agenda of the government, namely Published in Journal of Public Policy, 30, 3, 263-289 Kodate (2010) 15 performance ratings only created unfair and fierce competition and did not really help improve quality of care. Under these circumstances, performance ratings became heavily politicised, and the government became entangled in the details of the scheme. Scepticism was also on the increase regarding hospitals' fiddling with figures to achieve star ratings. St George's in London fell into a state of crisis over the coverup of budget deficits which were a result of its goal of achieving and maintaining excellent star ratings (TG, January 9, 2003; April 19, 2003; April 24, 2003) . This was followed by the accusation that Milburn had 'forced the hospital serving Tony Blair's constituency to be upgraded' in order to gain foundation status (TG, December 19, 2003; January 8, 2004 ). There was no response to this accusation except for the flat denial of such an act.
The establishment of regulatory agencies such as the CHI and its successor, the Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (CHAI or Healthcare Commission), was given extensive media attention.
Yet performance indicators remained politically controversial, and the blame for poor performance was still passed on to ministers. Upon his appointment as the head of the new Commission, Professor Kennedy (who had previously headed the public inquiry into the Bristol Royal Infirmary) quickly announced that star ratings should be replaced by new indicators, free from political interference, so that they would gain credibility (TG, December 19, 2003; July 21, 2004) . This later generated a row between him and the new Health Secretary John Reid, who wanted to keep the star ratings, which he claimed were simpler for patients to understand (TG, November 29, 2004 Policy, 30, 3, 263-289 Kodate (2010) 16 encompassing issues such as patient safety, the superbug MRSA, the hospital environment and the outcomes of operations. As a result, the earlier single yardstick was replaced by CHAI with a double grading, scoring trusts on a scale of A to E for their performance and one to five for leadership and the potential to improve. However small the actual changes made to the measurement system, it is worth highlighting the insistence of senior elected officials on retaining the 'user-friendliness' of the indicators.
The intertwined nature of the development processes of the monitoring body and the performance assessment exercises it mandated demonstrates the essential feature of quality assurance in the English NHS as a policy instrument for the central government, which thus renders itself vulnerable to public criticism.
In the English case, amid constant scrutiny in media reports, the government's position on the userfriendliness and transparency of the performance indicators became tenacious, as ministers sought to champion patient voices against the medical professions in the formulation of performance indicators.
The scheme was susceptible to political intervention and potential fiddling. Formal health care governance structures with strong ministerial accountability made the seemingly technical issue visible, and constantly held government performance in check. This case illuminated the highly responsive nature of the government to issue saliency.
Sweden: steady development of a profession-led scheme and resistance to hospital rankings In Sweden, with its decentralised public delivery system, there is no single unified system for quality assurance to date. However, economic downturn in the early 1990s spurred quality improvements in various parts of the country and resulted in some innovative schemes at county level, most prominently in Jӧnkӧping and Stockholm. At national level, national quality registries have been gradually developed as spin-offs from medical profession initiatives that originated in the 1970s. Each registry is operated by the relevant specialised association (e.g. heart surgery, breast cancer, diabetes) on the basis of voluntary participation. Market mechanisms introduced as a result of the purchaser-provider split and activity-based financing spurred serious discussions about performance, efficiency and patient choice (Blomqvist 2004), although the profession-based quality assessment system was retained and expanded. The registries are based on industrial quality improvement models and are essentially a self-learning instrument for medical specialists. In 1990, the two main professional associations, the Swedish Medical Association and the Swedish Society of Medicine set up a joint body called the Medical Quality Council, which was designed to carry out quality assessments.
With the central piece of administrative regulation Quality Assurance in Health and Hospitals including
Dental Care that took effect in January 1994, a quality assurance system (Kvalitetsregister) was launched.
The directive says: "all licensed health care and hospital personnel should pursue continuous, systematic Published in Journal of Public Policy, 30, 3, 263-289 Kodate (2010) 18 and documented quality assurance work including preventive measures, diagnosis, care and treatment" (National Board of Health and Welfare 1993). In 1995, the NBHW stated that its initiative comparing the quality and results of each hospital would drive competition among the professions and replace economic means of control in the future (DN, November 24, 1995) . Therefore it was publicised as a counter-market reform that put medical innovation first. This directive left significant room for health care professions to act independently at the local level" as it emphasised that "quality assurance should be done and refers to the need for comparisons in health care, the basis for which should be national indicators drawn up within professional organizations" (Garpenby 1997: 197) .
As Figure 3 indicates, media coverage of the registries was very limited. However, the loose control by government now in place, with considerable leeway for the professions, led to some criticism towards both government and the medical professions in 1996. In relation to the treatment of diabetes and preventive measures for complications suffered by diabetics, the need for mandatory participation in the registry and decisive action from the health care authorities in this regard were emphasised (Svenska Dagbladet, November 8, 1996; May 27, 1997) . Another criticism was levelled at the potential for the system to be abused by doctors by concealing real data relating to malpractice or poor quality of care. The article complained that "even the responsible NBHW does not know which registry exists and which one does not" (DN, June 18, 1996) .
However, managers of the quality registries backed the main purpose of the scheme, arguing that it consisted of quality improvement through organisational learning. The Federation of County Councils
Published in Journal of Public Policy, 30, 3, 263-289 Kodate (2010) (FCC) 9 had originally adopted this idea from an industrial quality monitoring and assessment system, Total Quality Management. The key aim is supposed to be self-learning based on voluntary participation and collaboration rather than supervision and control (SALAR 2005; SW-1). It is noted that the registries cover both outcome and process measures, such as post-operative morbidity, complications and relapses, as well as e.g. the number of haemodialysis sessions per week for renal patients. The lack of strong enforcement and intervention were viewed very positively by representatives of the medical profession (SW-2). For the NBHW, the collaboration of the medical professions was the key to the success of the whole scheme, and the participation of the medical profession was therefore deemed to be imperative.
As this governmental stance in relation to the scheme was called into question, demands for a third-party accreditation system began to gain support. The Swedish health system had no accreditation body comparable to e.g. the JCAHO (Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations) in the USA, although the NBHW and its six regional offices (Department of Supervision of Health Services, Tillsynsavdelningen) have been responsible for inspecting and monitoring service providers. 10 The reason for this was similar to that in the case of the NHS in England, where hierarchical control was in place in a predominantly public sector undertaking. The need to construct such a system in Sweden as well came with the introduction of an internal market. However, the idea of a third-party accreditation body was strongly opposed by the other major actors, i.e. the NBHW and the medical professions (Garpenby 1999: 419) . The government resolved to tighten its regulatory function by means of regulation (National Board of Health and Welfare 1996). Public Policy, 30, 3, 263-289 Kodate (2010) 20
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In 1999, another issue involving the registry surfaced on the national agenda, namely the possibility of ranking hospitals. Discussions had taken place between the then Social Democrat-led government and the NBHW with the aim of ranking hospitals across the country, but there was a mixture of enthusiasm and hesitation in both political camps. The Chief of the Medical Practice Unit of the NBHW, Claes Mebius, was quoted as saying that he was convinced that within a few years there would be a need for reviews of hospitals in Sweden, in light of the poor quality of care at that time (Svenska Dagbladet, April 29, 1999) .
Social Minister Lars Engqvist reacted the following day, making his stance clear on the ranking of hospitals. He argued that, from the patients' point of view, it was a natural development, and he was not convinced that visible differences between hospitals would do any harm to the current system, and Compounded with the ever-controversial issue of waiting lists, the lack of information was described as 'Russian roulette' (DN, November 18, 2002) . Once this transparency issue was placed on the agenda, the government could no longer escape criticism over its loose grip on the situation. Policy, 30, 3, 263-289 Kodate (2010) 22 hospitals for heart-disease patients ' (Expressen March 16/17, 2004) . One such hospital in Halmstad, in the county of Halland, responded swiftly in acknowledging its problems, and in fact received 30 million SEK 11 to tackle them (Hallandsposten, November 12, 2004) . In contrast to the naming and shaming practice as it worked in England, worse-performing hospitals benefited from the report. However, the NBHW publicly requested more openness from each hospital about their data (DN, November 26, 2004 ).
In 2005, there was both good and bad news for government. In spring, the FCC published a report which demonstrated the first-class quality of Swedish hospitals in international comparison (DN, April 21, 2005) .
Quality improvement in Jӧnkӧping, with a particular focus on continued learning in the areas of organisational processes and the systems approach was lauded by both the NBHW and international scientific community (Davies 2008) . Later in the year, the spotlight shifted to 'holes' not covered by the registries. In reaction to the criticisms about the lack of registries in psychiatry and elderly care, Minister
Ylva Johansson took the initiative and intervened to create registries in psychiatry (DN, October 14, 2005) and elderly care (DN, November 14, 2005) . At the beginning of 2006, there were more than 60 registries in receipt of economic support through the Steering Committee, with a further 100 registries and several new competence centres applying for funding.
In the decentralised Swedish health care system, the central government played a guarantor role, taking the non-interference approach. The government indirectly supported the profession-led model and
clinically-driven quality measures, which led to the gradual development of an existing monitoring system to complement various quality improvements at county level. The outcome showed that policy choice Published in Journal of Public Policy, 30, 3, 263-289 Kodate (2010) 29 widespread mistrust of doctors after several malpractice cases, it was the media companies that launched the first publically accessible rankings systems. Although the issue saliency was relatively low, the changing share of criticism between the government and the medical professions highlighted an interesting dynamic within the formal health care governance structures in Japan.
Discussion
As demonstrated by this tri-country comparative study, although quality assurance is seemingly a very technical area in the overall healthcare system, the respective governments have sought to demonstrate their responsiveness to public concerns to varying degrees. There are three factors at play in determining when and how each government intervenes in the development of quality assurance in health care. First, constantly high issue saliency holds government actions in check. The English case after 1998 clearly exemplified this. However, the patterns of issue saliency in each country suggested that the respective health care governance structures also influenced the volatility of public focus on the issue. The decentralised Swedish health care system had a very small number of newspapers featuring quality assurance in the national press. Volatility in the Swedish media was also remarkable. In contrast, the most centralised system, the English NHS, attracted by far the largest number of articles in the national media.
However, these issue saliency patterns also could not fully explain the policy trajectories in the three countries. By further examining the newspaper reports with comments critical of government and/or the medical profession, the study was able to identify the shifting public moods in each country and investigate further whether each government intervention made was in tune with the mood expressed in Published in Journal of Public Policy, 30, 3, 263-289 Kodate (2010) 30 the media. The results showed that despite its decentralised structure, the government agency at the national level in Sweden shared the blame with the medical profession when it seemed to be failing in its role as guarantor of care quality. The Japanese case also demonstrated that provision type (i.e. private in this case) does not always disperse blame from the government. The government was criticised for its lack of commitment to putting patients' interests first, even the accreditation system was run by a thirdparty body. It was not only the level of issue saliency but also the extent of the public discourses embedded in political institutions that were translated into pressure on each government (Kato and Rothstein 2006; 17, 2009 7. Although technically speaking it was not a radical break, as results from CGRs were integrated into the 'star ratings' for the first few years, it is worth noting the shift to a user-friendly, accessible label, 'star ratings', which yielded considerable publicity.
8. The CHI undertook responsibility for the assessment system in 2003. Of the four 'star' ratings, the highest category is defined as follows: trusts with the highest levels of performance are awarded a performance rating of three stars (http://www.chi.nhs.uk/ratings/).
9. In March 2007, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and the FCC formed a joint organisation, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR).
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